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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE ACTIVE ARMY AND THE RESERVE COMPONENTS: A NOT SO SILENT WAR

BY

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Silent War

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ABSTRACT

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The history of the relationship between the active Army, National Guard and the Army Reserve has been a long series of disagreements, misunderstandings and distrust. Numerous rifts have occurred during this history that have sometimes made it difficult for these organizations to work together as equal partners in defense of the United States.

Historically, these rifts have revolved around the roles that each of the components play in war and peace. The angst of each component keeps the rifts alive under the surface and allows them to break out with the least provocation based on perceived inequities.

In 1990, a rift between the Army and the reserve components opened that has not been healed to this day. This rift unlike the previous rifts has escalated for seven years and has damaged the relationship between the forces perhaps beyond repair.

This paper examines the history of past rifts and the evolution of the current rift. In order to determine if the components will be able to return to a reasonable accommodation

that will allow them to become the "Total Force" that will be necessary during this time of budget cuts and down sizing that appears to be the future of our armed forces.

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"Although the idea of citizen-soldiers is as old as the nation itself, today the concept of responsive Guard and Reserve Forces is vital in new ways. Our national strategy of deterrence requires that the organization, training, and equipment modernization of the Guard and Reserve keep pace with improvements in our Regular Forces. As fully integrated members of the Total Force, Guard and Reserve units must continue to attract quality people and high-caliber leadership. Geopolitical conditions and economic constraints no longer permit us to think of the Guard and Reserve as merely forces of last resort; we must recognize them as indispensable to our ability to defend the nation."

—Richard D. Lawrence, Lieutenant General The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force

The quote from LTG Richard D. Lawrence concerns the period beginning in 1973 with the Total Force Policy that is considered by many to be a renaissance in the relationship between the regular Army and the National Guard and Reserve. relationship that was forged between the components during this period is a reflection of how the defense of the nation could and should be managed. Unfortunately, since the beginning of the relationship between the Army and the militia or National Guard there have been few periods of true partnership and approximately two hundred years of wariness and distrust. While this distrust and wariness had frequently been below the surface, events have taken place that have caused open rifts to occur. In the past, the rifts were for fairly short duration and were resolved or at least returned to the sub surface after some form of settlement took place.

In 1990, the Total Force Policy was breached when the Army initially failed to call up the National Guard roundout brigades for the active duty divisions that were sent to the Gulf to drive Sadam Hussein out of Kuwait. This caused a rift that has been unlike previous rifts because it seems to be impossible to heal. This rift like many others has been played out on the public stage and large amounts of rhetoric have come from all sides of the issue. In order to understand the rift, we must first examine it from a historical perspective. What is the historical relationship between the regular Army and the reserve component? Second we must examine what dynamic between the components causes this rift to continue? Is this rift worse now then it was when it started? Is it possible for the sides to solve the problems or has the rift gone to far?

Both General Hugh Shelton and General Dennis Reimer, during separate address's to the Army War College Class of 1998, have listed the healing of this rift as one of their top priorities. The leaders of the National Guard have also stated that the end of the rift is a top priority. Why then can they not come to an understanding that will make it possible to return to the Total Force Policy and work toward the same common goal as partners in the defense of the nation?

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The militia system in North America is as old as the founding of the colonies. The English colonists were well grounded in the militia tradition and they were aware that they would be the only defense of their homes and the colony. They believed that serving in the militia was the obligation of every free white male settler between 16 and 60 years of age. In the charters issued by the king to the colonizing agencies, he gave them the right,

"to assemble Marshal Array and put in Warlike posture the inhabitants of said colony...to expulse repell and resist by force of arms...and also to kill slay destroy by all fitting ways ...all and every Person or Persons as shall attempt the destruction invasion detriment or annoyance of the inhabitants."

The militias were structured based on three concepts, local recruiting, short periods of active duty for immediate threats only and territorial restrictions on service. The officers were frequently elected and were civic leaders occupying positions of trust in their communities. While the colonies remained small villages and outpost the militia system worked well. Militia units met frequently and drilled at every meeting. As the colonies grew and the frontier was pushed farther west, the militia system became less important. The units began to meet less frequently and the meetings became more of a fraternal gathering than a drill.

The Indian Wars and the Franco-British Wars that were fought in North American during the late 1600's kept the militia system alive. Numerous militia members voluntarily left their communities and marched with the British against the French in Canada for the defense of the New England colonies. At no time did the colonies feel it necessary to create a standing force or improve the militia beyond its original limited scope.

By 1760, the militia system had virtually ceased to exist except as a tradition and a social organization. Their lack of training, shortage of weapons, slack discipline and general unwillingness to participate at critical times made them a force of little value to the colonies.

With the beginnings of the revolutionary movement in the colonies the militias began to revive, if only as a breeding ground for patriots. The First Continental Congress of 1774, called on the colonial governments to bolster their militias. The Second Congress constructed a uniform table of organization, recommended that companies elect their own officers and form their companies into regiments. The revolutionary government of Massachusetts directed all their companies to prepare one third of each command to respond instantly when called. These militia members became known as Minute Men from which the National Guard of today takes it symbol.

These Minute Men fought the first battle of the revolution with the British at Lexington, Massachusetts. This battle was

the beginning of a long struggle that would not end until 1783. During this struggle the militia played a strong role but they were not without their detractors. George Washington, himself a former militia member said of the militia, "They come in, you cannot tell how, go you cannot tell when, and act you cannot tell where, consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last at a critical moment."²

John Shy in his book, A People Numerous and Armed, states that the militia performed three important missions without which the Revolution could not have been won: militia's controlled communities, holding them to the patriot cause, militia's provided large numbers of armed men for brief periods of emergency service and using the militia system, authorities bribed or drafted enough men each year to keep the Continental Army alive.

In 1781, the Articles of Confederation were ratified. These articles stated that,

"Every state shall always keep up a well regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutered and shall provide, and constantly have ready for use, in public stores, a due number of field pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition and camp equipage."³

The Continental Army had ceased to exist by 1784 at which time the Congress decided to form a small replacement army consisting of 720 men who were drawn from various militias. This unit was to serve for one year and at the end of that year it was

extended an additional three years. "Thus, without drawing substantial contemporary notice, a militia force became in 1875 the nucleus of the original regiment of the United States regular army."

By the time of the Constitutional Convention, military issues were a major concern. Members of the convention who feared a strong central government and a standing army got their wish to have a state militia and at the same time a provision went into the Constitution allowing for the creation of a standing army. Article I of the Constitution codifies the role of the militia:

"The Congress shall have the power...To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."

When the United States declared war on England in 1812, Congress authorized the calling up of 100,000 members of the militia. At that time, the Governor of Connecticut, John Cotton Smith refused to allow the Connecticut militia to be called. He used as his rationale the fact that no insurrection had occurred nor was the militia needed to enforce the law. Other governors followed suit and a precedent was set that has continued into recent history with the National Guard.

During the 1812 War, incidents continued to occur in which the militia refused to perform. During the invasion of Canada by BG Hull, the Ohio militia refused to cross into Canada on statutory grounds. Hull was forced to surrender and when tried for cowardice, he testified that his failure had been due in large part to the rawness, lack of discipline, and insubordination of the militia.

Despite these problems the militia provided invaluable service during the War of 1812. Unfortunately, this war revealed the weaknesses of the militia system and gave further credence to the call of many for a larger standing army.

Between 1816 and 1860 the militia declined into a mostly ceremonially force that provided infrequent law enforcement support to the governor of the state. Various state militias participated in the wars against the Indian tribes, but none of these events changed the opinions held by the regular Army and many others that the citizen soldiers of the militia were ill disciplined rabble.

Large numbers of militia volunteered for the War with Mexico. Over 70 percent of the total forces were militia and the majority of these soldiers performed well. American's took pride in the conquest that the nation had made and the fact that this had been done without adding to the public debt or enlarging the regular Army was not lost on either the politicians or the citizens.

In 1861, President Lincoln called the state militia's into federal service to fight in the Civil War. Although the initial call was for 75,000 men, 93,000 militia soldiers answered the call. Unfortunately these soldiers were ill equipped and ill prepared for the war that was before them. In addition, a number of governors of the border states refused to allow their militia's to enter federal service. At the same time the militia's of the southern states entered the Confederate Army at much higher rate than the northern states. Russell Weigley in his book History of the United States Army, states "Merely by giving the Union a stop gap army and a breathing spell, the country's militia institutions amply justified themselves".

During the Civil War the old tension between the regulars and the militia soldiers continued to take place on both sides.

Militia officers were replaced by regular officers in many commands and this slight was remembered long after the war ended.

After the end of the Civil War, the militia virtually ceased to exist except on paper. Between 1865 and 1897, the National Guard, as it was now called in most states, was used primarily by Governors to put down labor riots, stop lynchings and to give aid during fires and floods. The Guard again became primarily a social organization.

In 1879, a group of Guard officers formed the National Guard Association(NGA) in order to support their view that the National Guard was an integral part of the United States military

establishment not just as a law enforcement organization. This organization became influential in the fight against the development of a single military establishment under the control of regular officers. The NGA successfully pushed legislation that raised the federal appropriations for the Guard and guaranteed one hundred active Guardsmen for every senator and congressmen through Congress in 1887. This set the precedent for the Guard to go directly to Congress to push its agenda which it has used liberally in the ensuing years.

In 1898, a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives by John Hull to enlarge the size of the wartime army to 104,000 men. This bill did not include the National Guard as a source of manpower for the Army. The bill was soundly defeated in Congress with the assistance of the NGA and shortly followed by a bill that called for volunteers to be drawn from the states in proportion to the population of the state. This bill allowed entire National Guard units to volunteer for federal duty and retain their officers.

The sinking of the battleship Maine on April 15, 1898 and the subsequent declaration of war against Spain caused a ground swell of 125,000 volunteers to enter the Army under the Volunteer Act of 1898. These volunteers were largely members of National Guard units and in many cases entire units.

The Volunteer Act included a provision that allowed the President to appoint all general officers and their staffs for volunteer units. McKinley shifted 441 regular officers to positions in the volunteer units and 481 volunteer officers into regular commissions. In addition, he appointed one hundred two general officers, sixty six came from the regular army the rest from political appointments and the volunteer units. 10

The Spanish American War was of fairly short duration.

Unfortunately during the preparations for war and the subsequent fighting, members of the National Guard clashed with the regular officers appointed into their units. The Guardsman felt that the regular officers were attempting to impose a caste system on them.

After the war in Cuba ended, President McKinley ordered troops into the Philippines. The majority of the troops were volunteers from the western states. The volunteers were not well equipped and suffered significant casualties both from battle and disease. By the summer of 1899 the volunteers began to return to their homes in the United States. These volunteers were received as hero's in their home towns and this contributed to the National Guard tradition of the states.

In 1900, an event took place that changed the National Guard from the state militia as it had been instituted in the Uniform Militia Act of 1792. Major General Charles Dick, the Commander of the Ohio National Guard, a Congressman from Ohio and the Chairman of the House Committee on the Militia appointed a panel of members from the NGA to draft a bill concerning the make-up

and management of the militia. The War Department submitted a bill first that was based largely on the draft bill from the NGA. The bill included one provision that would allow for the formation of a national reserve that was not associated with the states. After much fighting in Congress the Army withdrew the reserve provision and the bill was passed. The law became know as the Dick Act and it started the volunteer militia on the path toward federalization.

The Dick Act required the National Guard to conform to national standards. All state units were required to drill at least twenty four times per year and attend a five-day summer camp. Further, states were required to account for all United States property and all moneys given to the state by the federal government. This act allowed the Army to have the beginnings of the control that they have over the National Guard of today. The states did not object as strenuously as they might have to the loss of control inherent in the Dick Act because they were more concerned about the provision that allowed for the formation of a Reserve of the Army. Although this provision was removed prior to passage of the bill it would surface again later.

In 1912, MG Leonard Wood, a long time detractor of the National Guard, got a rider on an Army Appropriation Act that established a national reserve. The original concept failed because it contained no sanctions and few members joined the organization. During this period members of the NGA came to

believe that the General Staff of the Army did not wish to see the organized militia become stronger. It was at this time that the NGA began in earnest to use Congress to achieve their aims. 11

In 1916, the National Defense Act was passed. This act allowed for the formation of an Officers and Enlisted Reserve Corps, free of state entanglements. At this time the relationship between the Army and the Guard deteriorated severely. During an NGA convention in San Francisco, Henry Breckinridge, the Assistant Secretary of War told the gathered militia members "You will either come into the continental army or you will get out. The National Guard will no longer have any federal sanction. States which want to maintain their own guard will have that privilege". 12

During this same period the Secretary of the Army Garrison wrote a letter to President Wilson describing the problem between the Guard and the Army,

"The issue...has nothing whatever to do with the numbers of men to be raised or with the means of raising them...It is between two absolutely different systems, one of which is based upon the Nation undertaking upon its own responsibility the raising and management of the national troops; and the other of which leaves us in a position that we have always been in since the institution of the Government-to rely upon the States doing this for the Nation-a situation in which the Nation is relying upon a military force that it does not raise, that it does not officer, that it does not train, and that it does not control." 13

The National Defense Act of 1916 changed a number of laws concerning the Guard, at the request of the Chief of the Militia

Bureau. These changes included: standardization of state military codes, authorization for the President to prescribe the kind of units each state would maintain, rules on organization, strength, armament, standardization in appointment of officers, provisions for a dual oath to state and federal government and the ability to order the National Guard beyond the borders of the United States.

On April 2, 1917, President Wilson ask Congress for a Declaration of War against Germany. In a speech shortly after the declaration was approved, Wilson recognized the importance of the citizen soldiers. "It is not an army that we must shape and train, it is a nation." The first Guard units had been called to federal service in March of 1917 and by the 25th of July the entire National Guard had been call to service. Shortly after the last of the Guard units were called, President Wilson drafted all members of the Guard which caused the Guardsmen to become members of the United States Army. Units were reorganized and the majority of the old Guard units disappeared.

General Peyton C. March added additional fuel to the fire on 31 July 1918 when he forced the Guardsmen to remove all state insignia from their uniforms. Many Guard officers were removed from their units as being physically unfit to serve. By mid 1918, all but one of the Guard generals had been removed from command and a few regular generals who had been placed in command of Guard divisions were also removed. During hearings following

the war, General Pershing admitted that the Army had never during the conflict given the Guard its wholehearted support. 15

Immediately following the War, Congress began hearings on reorganizing the military establishment. At this time, many reasons for the elimination of the Guard were given but the major reasons were: The Guard could not be used beyond national boundaries, Guard soldiers tended to be less trained and less committed than regulars and Guard units had significant strength problems.

The NGA and The Adjutant Generals' Association worked hard to counter these allegations in Congress. Bennett Clark, President of the NGA said "We are all absolutely united...to build up the Guard and smash the regular Army." The NGA wanted specific outcomes of any bill that was passed: (1) National Guardsmen rather than regulars should hold the position of Chief of the Militia Bureau, (2) The Bureau should be shifted from the control of the General Staff, (3) The War Department must be required to bring units instead of individuals into federal service and (4) Whatever law was passed must designate the National Guard as an integral part of the efficient, national military force in peace time and in war. 17

The National Defense Act of 1916 was amended in 1920 to give the Guard all of the things they had hoped for. It further limited the size of the Army while increasing the size of the

Reserve. Finally, it allowed Guard officers to serve on the General Staff and provided for additional drill pay for units.

In 1933, Congress further amended the National Defense Act of 1916. The amendment originated by the NGA constituted the Guard as "a reserve component of the Army of the United States." This allowed the President to order the individuals and units of the reserve component into federal service anytime Congress declared a national emergency. This made it unnecessary to dissolve Guard units and draft their members as individuals. 18

In 1940, with Hitler overrunning most of Western Europe,
Congress declared a national emergency and at the request of
General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, the National
Guard was federalized. General Marshall later admitted that he
made the request to federalize the Guard more to get their
equipment than to get the soldiers. The Guard carried out the
Presidential order for federalization and placed in federal
service a total of 299,045 soldiers in 1940. The regular Army at
that time contained 264,118 soldiers. The slogan used by the
Guard to recruit their forces at that time was "Join the Guard
and go with the boys you know."19

At this time, LTG Lesley J. McNair controlled the mobilization of the Guard. LTG McNair was no friend of the Guard and wrote a memorandum to General Marshall that contained a stinging indictment of the Guard,

"One of the great lessons of the present war is that the National Guard, as organized before the war, contributed nothing to national defense...The structure of the National Guard was pregnant with disaster for the entire nation." 20

LTG McNair had many mobilized units inspected and reported as deficient because they did not have proper clothing and equipment. They lacked this equipment because the Army did not have it available for issue to these units. All these deficiencies were used to replace Guard officers with regular officers in senior positions, much as they had in World War I. Further, the newly instituted age-in-grade regulations of the Army eliminated over 1,000 officers who were above the maximum age for Captain.

LTG McNair continued to describe the National Guard in very unflattering terms throughout the war. In 1944, he wrote the following: "The training experience of this headquarters for nearly four years has its most important lesson in the inadequacy of the National Guard in practically every essential.."²¹

In 1945, the Joint Regular-Guard Committee on postwar military posture formulated a policy that stated the Guard was always to be an integral part and first-line reserve component of the postwar military establishment. This policy protected the position of the Guard and prevented any attempts to eliminate the Guard after the war.

The National Security Act of 1947 implied that the reserve components would have to become more integrated within the unified defense system. The Guard began to grow with soldiers

who had left active duty after the war and with young men hoping to avoid the draft which had been extended in 1946. By 1949, the Guard had 356,000 soldiers assigned to 4,875 units in 4,000 communities. The money that was appropriated by Congress was not enough to support this large an organization and the Army forced the Guard to reduce to 350,000 members.

In 1947, James Forrestal, the first Secretary of Defense, appointed a board to determine what was the best use for the reserves. The Gray board, named after its chairman, determined that the Guard with its dual federal-state mission could not enhance the national security and recommended that the Guard be merged into the Organized Reserve. Forrestal agreed with this recommendation.

The Guard and its defenders immediately labeled this recommendation as an attempt to discredit the Guard. The NGA further accused the regular officer corps of instigating this recommendation in an attempt to do away with the Guard once and for all. The NGA and other defenders of the Guard went directly to Congress and the Gray board recommendations never left the committee and no Army officials spoke publicly about the recommendations.

In 1949, Secretary of Defense Johnson, established a Civilian Components Policy Board which was to review all matters concerning the reserve components. This board was renamed the Reserve Forces Policy Board when George C. Marshall succeeded

Johnson. The board with the support of the NGA, the Reserve Officers Association and the American Legion prepared and sent to Congress a bill that called for Universal Military Training (UMT). The concept of UMT had been around for many years and had been defeated in Congress twice before this bill was passed. Both times it had been defeated with the help of the NGA. This time they supported the bill because they felt that it did not impinge on the provisions of the Selective Service Act of 1940, that supported the National Guard as an integral part of the first line of defense.

The UMT stipulated that it could not go into effect until the National Security Training Commission had established a set of rules to govern it. When the proposed rules were forwarded to Congress, the NGA came out in opposition to the bills because they did not provide for either prior servicemen or inductees to go into the National Guard to perform their service. The UMT enabling legislation was overcome by events in 1950 when the North Korean Army invaded South Korea.

Initially after the invasion it was believed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the action would be too short to justify full scale mobilization. Therefore, instead of calling the reserves the President decided to use the draft to obtain the necessary forces. As the war dragged on the Army was forced to begin calling Guard members because of their individual skills. Before the end of the war over one-third of the Army National

Guard had been ordered into service. As in World War I & II unit integrity was not maintained.

During this period, a significant breach appeared between the National Guard and the Army Reserve over a bill that was suppose to be the "Magna Carta" for the reserve components. At first, the Guard supported the bill which passed the House and went on to the Senate. But the NGA decided that the bill favored the Reserve over the Guard and withdrew its support. The bill was ultimately adopted with significant amendments offered by the NGA and this became the Armed Forces Reserve Act (AFRA) of 1952. The major provisions of this act included,

"elimination of the delay when officers changed from one reserve component to another, reaffirmation of priority for the Guard to be ordered into federal service ahead of the reserve, it directed the military services to order Guard units into service as far as possible, it created the Standby Reserve.., it created the Retired Reserve."²³

After the end of the Korean War, the Guard became part of the Eisenhower administration "New Look" for the military. This "New Look" was made up of conventional forces that the economy could support and which would provide adequate manpower to cope with the Cold War. The defense policy required greater reliance on the reserve components and this was very encouraging to the National Guard leadership. During this period, Dr. John Hanna, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower provided a significant jolt to the Guard when he identified civil defense as the primary role for the Guard. Shortly after this information

was made public, the head of the NGA, General Walsh said, "If they want war, let it begin here!,"24 Significant rhetoric occurred and eventually Dr. Hanna was forced to recant his statement and say that the Guard was the most reliable segment of the reserve component.

In 1955, Congress decided to upgrade the reserve component. Representative Carl Vinson from Georgia, who was the chair of the House Armed Services Committee, proposed a bill which was passed in August of 1955, called the Reserve Forces Act. The law extended the draft until 1959, it allowed the Army and Air Force Reserve to enlist men between 17-18 years old and exempt them from the draft, it reduced the maximum military obligation from eight to six years, raised the ceiling of the Ready Reserve from 1,5000,000 to 2,900,000 men and required that all recruits would have to go through six months of basic training.

CURRENT RIFT

To understand the current rift, we must first examine two events, the first took place in the mid sixties the second in 1973. The first of these events is the Vietnam War and the failure to call the National Guard to participate in the war. The second event is the institution of the Total Force Policy during the Nixon and Ford administration. Each of these events have effected the relationship of the active Army and the reserve component in a different way but a correlation can be drawn

between the two events and the current perceptions of both Army and National Guard leadership.

THE VIETNAM ERA AND THE NATIONAL GUARD

Bennie J. Wilson in the foreword to his anthology, The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force, which was published in 1985, discussed what he believed was a fairly widely held belief among army officers of that era concerning the National Guard and its failure to participate to any large extent in the Vietnam War. The Guard was seen as a haven for draft dodgers and cowards seeking to avoid service in the War. There were allegations made at that time that well connected and wealthier young men were able to join the Guard instead of being drafted due to their family political and social connections with various state officials and local Guard leaders.

These same allegations were to surface in the 1980's during the political campaign of George Bush concerning his Vice Presidential running mate Dan Quayle. It became obvious at that time that adverse beliefs about the Guard and Reserve and the Vietnam War were held fairly widely in the civilian community in addition to the military community.

The facts concerning the decision not to mobilize the reserve tell a different story. Early in the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, President Johnson decided not to mobilize the reserve and rely on draftees to fight the war. In making this decision

he overruled both his Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff who wanted to mobilize 200,000 reservists. John Mahon in his book History of the Militia and the National Guard gives three reasons for the Johnson decision. One, to conceal from the American people the high level of military commitment that the nation was making in a distant land. Two, to avoid sending belligerent vibration to the North Vietnamese. Three, to preserve the reserve component as an untapped power available to meet further contingencies for fulfilling our treaty commitments.

In addition to adverse perceptions of the reserve by both the general public and the military, the reserve was stripped of the majority of its essential equipment needed for the active forces and reserve training came to a virtual standstill without the equipment. By the end of the war the training and morale of the reserve was at an all time low.

THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY

During the 1968 Presidential campaign, Richard Nixon's staff conceived a plan to abolish the draft. This move was formalized in 1969 with the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (Gates Commission). The Commission in it's 1970 report stated, "We have satisfied ourselves that a volunteer force will not jeopardize national security, and we believe it will have a beneficial effect on the military as well as the rest of our society." The Commission suggested an end to induction not

later than June 30, 1971. The administration ask for an extension of the date until June 30, 1973 and the extension was approved.

At the same time the Nixon administration began a draw down of the Vietnam War era Army. By mid 1972, the Army had been reduced to approximately the size it was in 1950. The end of the draft and the large force reductions had major implications for the future of the armed forces. In order to off-set the reductions in the active forces, the Nixon administration unveiled its Total Force concept.

This concept had been the brain child of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. He explained the principle as follows,

"Emphasis will be given to concurrent consideration of the total forces, active and reserve, to determine the most advantageous mix to support national strategy and meet the threat. A total force concept will be applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping and employing Guard and Reserve Forces."²⁷

This concept was widely perceived as a rebirth for the Guard and Reserve. Secretary Laird clarified their expanded role in a memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments on September 9, 1970,

"Guard and Reserve units and individuals of the Selected Reserves will be prepared to be the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces."

This concept was emphatically embraced by the reserve components.

Secretary Laird recognized that the reserves were not

prepared for this challenge and he directed a number of changes to better prepare them: Increase the readiness, reliability and timely responsiveness of the combat and combat support units, support and maintain minimum average trained strengths, provide and maintain combat standard equipment in necessary quantities and provide the necessary controls to identify resources committed for logistic support through the planning, programming, budgeting, procurement and distribution system.

Based on this guidance, the Army in 1972 reorganized it command structure for management of the reserves from the Continental Army Command into Forces Command and Training and Doctrine Command. This entirely changed the way the Army would advise, evaluate, and assist the reserves. Forces Command would provide support through nine Army Readiness Regions with teams of branch and functional experts to provide on-the-spot readiness assistance.

General LaVern Weber, Chief of National Guard Bureau embraced the Total Forces Policy in the National Guardsman magazine edition of October 1972,

"The Total Force Policy is rational, logical and workable. There is really no alternative to a military strategy based on realistic interface of the active, the National Guard and the Reserve forces. If there is an alternative it is a huge standing Army and Air Force, which would fail the affordability test by all standards."

Never the less, the Army during the early part of the 1970 did not provide to the reserve component all the training and

readiness assistance that had been promised by the Total Force Policy. Secretary Laird's successor James Schlesinger reminded the services of the importance of their reserve components in a Memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments in August of 1973, "Total force is no longer a concept. It is now the Total Force Policy which integrates the Active, Guard, and Reserve forces into a homogeneous whole."

The Army which had been reduced to thirteen divisions after Vietnam was compelled to assign more responsibility to the reserves, both to complement its diminished combat strength and to augment it support forces. The Army was able to convince the Ford Administration to restore it to a sixteen division force. Unfortunately it was restored without any additional manpower.

In order to make up the additional three divisions, the Army converted support billets into combat billets and moved the support billets into the reserve. This did not fill all the combat billets that were needed. At this time the roundout concept was introduced, four active divisions would be composed of two active brigades and one reserve brigade. The roundout brigades were expected to deploy with their parent units and were given higher priorities for equipment, personnel, and training resources.

Because of these trade-offs, by 1989 two thirds of the Army's tactical support capability was in the reserves. These units included many that would be needed early in a crisis. 28

After the implementation of the Total Force Policy a truce took place between the active Army and the Guard and Reserve.

The CAPSTONE program aligned reserve units with the active duty units they were to go to war with in numerous contingency plans. The units trained and exercised together and although there were significant issues concerning the equipping of the reserve components to an adequate standard the relationship between the components appeared to be well on its way to a partnership.

DESERT STORM AND THE BREAKING OF THE PARTNERSHIP

In August of 1990, Iraqi invaded Kuwait and the United States found itself as the leader of a coalition to drive the Iraqi's out of that country. Emotions in the United States ran high to assist the people of Kuwait in their battle for freedom from the invader. President George Bush ordered a Presidential Call-up under section 673(b) of Title 10 USC, which allowed for the mobilization of 200,000 reserve component soldiers for 180 days in order to provided the needed military support for the mission. Shortly after the invasion units of the regular Army as well as National Guard and Reserve units began to receive alert notifications.

Early in the mobilization process the units of the 24th Infantry Division were ordered to deploy to Saudi Arabia. The roundout brigade of the 24th was the 48th Infantry Brigade of the Georgia National Guard. The 48th was not activated at the time

of the activation of the 24th. In fact, the 48th was replaced by the 197th Infantry Brigade, the schoolhouse Brigade from Ft.

Benning. The 197th had not trained with the 24th and was considered to be not combat ready at the time it was called.

National Guard leadership immediately ask for an explanation of the reasoning for failure to call the 48th. Initially, the Army said that the section of Title 10 that was used by the President, which allowed for a ninety day call up followed by a 90 day extension, did not provide enough time for a Guard combat brigade to be called up, trained and deployed.

Much has been written about what occurred with the 48th after the initial failure to activate the unit and it will not be recounted here. Suffice it to say that none of the National Guard roundout brigades deployed to the desert although they were finally activated in November and December of 1990 after the insistence of Congress as a test of the roundout concept.²⁹

The significance of the failure to call the roundout brigades with their parent units should not be underestimated. The actions taken by the Army in late August and early September of 1990, broke perhaps irrevocably the Total Force partnership between the regular Army and the National Guard. The rift that occurred at that time has continued virtually unabated through the present day.

ATTEMPTS TO RETURN TO THE TOTAL FORCE

After the debacle with the roundout brigades, it didn't seem possible that the situation could become worse. But there was much more to come. In 1992, during hearings on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, General Gordon Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the Army, testified "...In my opinion, supported by the data, we cannot train people to fight in combat brigades in less than 90 days...We cannot train divisions to fight in less than 365 days." This was a direct contradiction of the previous thirty years of Cold War policy which was based on the ability to call Guard divisions within 45-60 days in case of Soviet attack.

In early 1993, an offsite meeting was conducted which included participants from the Army, National Guard, Reserve, NGAUS, ROA and other interested organizations. This offsite was a hopeful step towards returning to a Total Force relationship between the components. Decisions were made at that meeting that would have impacts on all three components through 1996 and all attendees appeared to be determined to present a united front on issues of strength, force make-up and future missions.

This offsite did not heal the rift, but it did quiet the rhetoric and accusations until the next significant event the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces. (CORM)

The report from the CORM concluded that there was excess combat

forces in the National Guard based on the fact that no Guard divisions were used in war plans for any major regional conflict. In addition, it noted that the Guard divisions would not be ready in time to participate in the currently planned scenarios which included wars of the magnitude and type conducted in the Gulf.

The next major review was the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) which began in 1996 and was released in May 1997. This review was conducted by the Department of Defense on its own programs. The results of that review strengthened the reserve components belief that the Army was out to get them. The National Guard immediately went to Congress with the complaint that they had not had adequate representation on the QDR panel. The results of the QDR called for a major restructuring of the Reserve components to include a lose of combat structure, the conversion of units to CS/CSS and the loss of an additional 45,000 personnel.³⁰

At this point the rift got completely out of control.

Accusations began to fly on both sides. The Assistant Vice Chief of Staff LTG Jay Garner, in an article in the National Journal, accused the NGAUS of being a hot-bed of sedition "implemented by a narrow set of individuals that don't have the true interests of the nation at heart." Congress held hearings in July 1997 on who represented the National Guard during the QDR. A bill was introduced in the house to make the Chief National Guard Bureau position a four star member of the Joint Chiefs.

In an attempt to avoid further public feuding, Secretary Cohen ordered the Army to hold an offsite in June of 1997 with National Guard and Army Reserve leaders. During the meeting a deal was struck that called for the active Army to take all of its 15,000 troop cut over the next three years, the National Guard would take 17,000 of its QDR proposed 38,000 cut and the Reserve would take a cut of 3,000 during the same period. The additional cuts in the Guard were to take place after 2000 and be completed by 2002. An additional result of the meeting was the proposal of "Eleven Principles" that were developed to guide future Total Army discussions. After the meeting much additional rhetoric occurred on whether these principles had been agreed to including comments by General Reimer in October 1997,

"I looked at those 11 principles. As far as agreeing or disagreeing with them, I think, conceptually, that they make good sense. I don't see anything in there that I totally disagree with. I do find that there are going to be some resource issues.... I think if you're not getting enough resources to do all the things that they want done in the 11 principles, then you have to have a funding philosophy that, basically, centers around the first to fight units." 31

In February 1997, the follow on review to the QDR began. This National Defense Panel (NDP) appointed by Congress began its own review of national defense policies and published a final report that was somewhat different than the QDR. This report reaffirmed the Guard's dual role as it was outlined in the Constitution and suggested that the Guard should play a more in

depth role in the defense of the nation both at home an abroad. The panel further recommended: Expanded reserve roles for use in ongoing missions, assign reserve units to selected homeland defense missions, assign selected units at battalion and lower levels to active division and brigades, maintain equipment interoperability among and active and reserve units.³²

CAN THE RIFT BE HEALED?

As of the writing of this paper there has been little progress in the healing of the rift. Progress cannot be made to heal this rift unless both sides are willing to participate in the healing. Until some basic questions can be answered about the future of the Total Force, I do not see a change in the current situation.

It appears to be inevitable that the military is going to continue to downsize due to the lack of a viable threat and the feelings of the American people that a large military, active or reserve, is no longer necessary. This is not necessarily a bad thing for the country and its citizens. The Army today is bigger percentage wise than it has ever been during peace time. Because the American people do not appear to want to continue funding this large Army, it is time to take a look at what the size of the Total Force will be in the future.

In order to make any determinations about the size of the Total Force, we must first determine what Total Force means

today. Is today's Total Force Policy the same as it was in 1973, to organize, train and equip the Guard and Reserve to keep pace with improvements in the Regular Force. Or should the Total Force Policy today be one of balancing between budgetary constraints, desired capabilities, and a realistic threat evaluation without bias toward maintaining a status quo active force.

Determining what the role and size of the components is, has been and will always be the most difficult because it requires a determination on who will provide the combat power to the war In 1994, Rand completed a study for the Army called "Army Culture and Planning in a Time of Great Change". This study discussed the centrality of the division and the fact that the Army to some extent measures its well-being by the number of The National Guard also measures its divisions it maintains. well-being by the number of divisions it maintains. Perhaps the question should be not where the divisions are but whether the divisions are still necessary to the military. Is it possible that a different force configuration is necessary in this time of lower expectations and significantly less funding. Both the Army and the National Guard are having trouble supporting these large combat structures and the current division redesign for both components may not be the best answer.

The Rand Study also discusses the active component distrust of the reserve because of the political independence that has

been demonstrated by primarily the National Guard but recently the Army Reserve as well. This independence goes against the Army leaderships belief in the principles of teamwork, obedience and loyalty. This also cannot be solved until the components have a mutual understanding and agreement on what the Total Force must look like and what each sides role in this force is. This requires a level of trust from the reserve component that is not there and will be hard to establish after the significant amount of time that the reserve component has distrusted the Army.

Have the Army and the National Guard reached a stalemate in their attempt to heal the rift between them? Yes, I believe they have. Fundamentally this has occurred because of the different views the two sides take about what the role of the National Guard is. The Army sees the reserve components as an extension of itself. It believes that it should control and manage the reserve force in accordance with its policies and wishes. D. Allan Youngman in his paper, "Citizen Soldiers, Combat and the Future", provides an outstanding analysis of the Guard view of its role,

"The Guards view of its raison d'etre is fundamentally different. They reject outright the notion that the existence of the Guard is a matter of grace or in any way dependent upon the discretion-or goodwill- of the active Army....Although it can-like the USAR-augment and support the active force, its real purpose is to expand the nation's military when national security requires more forces than can normally be afforded on active duty during peacetime. While it makes up part of America's Army, it does so as a partner-not a step-child-of the active component."

RECOMMENDATION FOR HEALING THE RIFT

The rift between the active Army and the reserve cannot be healed without the intervention of a third party to serve as an honest broker. Secretary of Defense William Cohen has accepted this role and has articulated four principles that are necessary to achieve a Total Force: Clear understanding of the Army's responsibility for and ownership of the Total Force by its senior leaders; clear mutual understanding on the mission for each active, Guard and Reserve unit; an Army commitment to provide resources; maintaining leaders that ensure readiness in the Total Force.³³

Secretary of the Army Togo West ordered Army leaders to reenergize the Army Reserve Forces Policy Board and the Reserve Components Coordination Council. He further established a forum co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army with membership to include Guard and Reserve leaders from the field as well as appropriate Army staff.

Both the active Army and the Guard must agree to support a rhetoric free test of the Integrated Division concept. This proposal should be seen by both sides as an opportunity to add combat power to the war fight. Only through cooperation will

seamless integration of reserve units into the active Army be effective and this should be the ultimate goal of both sides.

In addition to a rhetoric free test of the Integrated Division concept both sides must agree to establish a period of time in which they will not bash the other in public. The meetings that will be held in support of Cohen's principles must have a free flow of ideas and recommendations without the fear of a constant barrage of adverse publicity in the press. Further, they must agree to presented a united front for the rest of the world while they are attempting to work through the problems that exist between them.

The hardest decision that has to be made will concern the size and shape that the Total Army of the future is going to take. A culture change needs to take place on both sides to allow for a change in the way both components are structured. I believe that the division concept will not survive as it is today. Even the current redesigned divisions may be the wrong structure for the Total Army of the 21st Century. This will be the most difficult change that may have to come and it leaves the most room for misunderstanding and disagreement.

Finally, I agree with D. Allen Youngman, that Congress must take a stand to allow this process to happen without interference. It must not take sides in an attempt to allow the process to work. It can force the Army and the Reserve

components to integrate and it should by holding all sides responsible for their action.

There is a chance to end the rift between the Army and the Reserve components but it will not be done without a considerable amount of heartache and misunderstanding on the part of all concerned. It will be a long process with fits and starts because it will be difficult for both sides to get past their feelings of distrust and wariness. It will take hard work, patience, fortitude and the ability to give and take to serve the best interest of the Total Army and the Nation it is sworn to protect.

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ENDNOTES

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- 3 Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation; an Interpretation of the Social-constitutional History of the American Revolution, 1774-1781 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959),265.
 - Mahon, 41.
- ⁵ The Constitution of the United States of America, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1992.
 - ⁶ Mahon, 67.
 - ⁷ Ibid., 68.
- William H. Riker, Soldiers of the States, The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957),63.
 - Mahon, 128.
 - ¹⁰ Ibid., 129.
- 11 Martha Derthick, The National Guard in Politics, (Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1965), 54.
 - 12 Riker, 77.
 - ¹³ Ibid., 78.
 - ¹⁴ Mahon, 154.
 - 15 Riker, 81.
 - ¹⁶ Mahon, 170.
 - 17 Derthick, 54.
 - ¹⁸ Ibid., 65.
 - ¹⁹ Mahon, 181.
 - ²⁰ Ibid., 181-182.
 - Derthick, 79.
 - ²² Mahon, 200-202.
 - ²³ Ibid., 213.
 - ²⁴ Derthick, 111.
 - ²⁵ Mahon, p.216
- ²⁶ Martin Binkin and William Kaufmann, U.S. Army Guard & Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1989), 22.

 27 Ibid., 24

 - ²⁸ Binkin, 36.
- D. Allen Youngman, Citizen-soldiers, Combat and the Future, (Unpublished article, 1998), 26.
- 30 William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997

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